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“Garbled demography” or “Demographization of the 
social”? – A Foucaultian Discourse Analysis of  
German Demographic Change at the  
Beginning of the 21st Century 
Reinhard Messerschmidt ∗ 
Abstract: »‘Verstümmelte Demografie’ oder ‘Demografisierung des Gesell-
schaftlichen‘? – Eine Foucaultsche Diskursanalyse des demografischen Wan-
dels in Deutschland des beginnenden 21. Jahrhunderts«. German discourses of 
demographic change are characterized by alarmist scenarios. Especially since 
the turn of the millennium, a growing amount of publications addresses popu-
lation aging and shrinking by depicting mostly dystopian future scenarios. Al-
legedly inevitable consequences with fundamental relevance for society are of-
ten proclaimed in the media and social-scientific discourses. Although most 
demographers alert to the fact that population projections should not be inter-
preted as prognoses, they are often employed as irrefutable knowledge as well 
as camouflage for normative positions. Complex demographic measures are 
frequently misinterpreted by journalists, who consequently produce “garbled 
demography” (Teitelbaum 2004). However, the “demographization of the so-
cial” (Barlösius 2007) turns out to be more complex than a misunderstanding or 
a distortion of “neutral” scientific facts. Michel Foucault’s works provide a 
framework of suitable complexity in order to analyze the depth-structures of 
both discourses and their interrelations. This paper will first describe relevant 
conditions of existence of demographic knowledge orders, their rules of for-
mation, and discursive regularities in order to shed light on the demographic 
ontology of the present. Subsequently, these depth structures will be related to 
preliminary results of a discourse analysis of 2900 press articles from leading 
German newspapers and journals covering the period from 2000 to 2012. In 
conclusion, first contours of a recently emerging post-alarmist discourse will be 
outlined. 
Keywords: Demographic change, demography, population, Michel Foucault, 
discourse analysis, governmentality, games of truth, ontology of the present, 
epistemology. 
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1.  Introduction 
Alarmist “demodystopias”, or as Andreu Domingo1 refers to them “prospects 
of demographic hell” (Domingo 2008), depicted in press articles are pervasive. 
Here is a short illustrative selection of quite “normal” headlines2 which provide 
a compact insight into this article’s main concern: 
- “Germany 2014: Humans go, Wolves come” (Süddeutsche 2004-08-18), 
- “Land without people” (Die Zeit 20/2001), 
- “The aged republic” (Die Zeit 02/2003) 
- “The last German – on the way to the elderly republic” (Spiegel 2004-05-
01) 
- “In twelve generations we Germans will become extinct“ (BILD 2006-03-
15) 
- “German population is shrinking and aging dramatically” (Spiegel 2006-11-
07) 
- “Continuously fewer Germans” (Süddeutsche 2010-02-24) 
- “Shrinking and becoming senile” (taz, 2011-10-27).  
- “Demographic change – where villages die out in Germany” (Welt Online, 
2011-11-28) 
- “Deserted landscapes in Eastern Germany” (Focus Online, 2011-11-31) 
- “Aging society: zero growth erodes social systems” (Financial Times Ge-
many, 2011-12-29). 
Demographic change, typically understood as aging of the population 
(Schimany 2003) with respect to its subsequent shrinking (Kaufmann 2005) has 
become a commonplace in German3 social-scientific as well as mass-media 
discourses since the turn of the millennium. It would exceed the boundaries of 
this article to list the overwhelming amount of publications dealing with the 
topic. Nevertheless, the Google Ngram Viewer can help in creating a first im-
pression about the general quantitative tendency in the German language 
Google books corpus, which consists of 657,991 digitized volumes published 
within the period of 1998-2008 (Lin et al. 2012, 170). A massive increase in 
usage frequencies of the phrase can be observed in Google’s corpus since 2004, 
                                                             
1  The Spanish demographer Domingo (2008, 725) defines the term as “Dystopias that are 
brought about by demographic change or that make population matters a salient concern”, 
but uses it in the different context of fictional literature of the past centuries. 
2  Translated by author; The first example based on ”research” by the think tank Berlin Insti-
tute for Population and Development is most likely falsified by reality (as long as nothing 
unforeseen and severe will happen in the remaining time). 
3  The focus on Germany is not an arbitrary choice, but rather a result of the author’s research 
experience and background. A comparative analysis would have been also interesting, but at 
the expense of depth and complexity, as the only existing comparative analysis in the field 
(Georgiadis 2011) shows. 
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while an initial increase of the slope can already be noticed around the turn of 
the millennium. In 2008, the frequencies are approximately 4.5 times higher 
compared to 2000. The nearly exponential trajectory of the curve illustrates the 
permanently growing relevance of the topic, at least in the considerably large 
corpus of Google books. 
Figure 1: Cumulated NGrams of the Google Books Corpus for Term 
“Demographic Change” (Including Old/New Orthography and 
Different Flexions) 
 
Source: own calculation based on NGram Viewer results <books.google.com/ngrams>. 
 
Discourses of demographic change have become very powerful in the last 
years, especially in Germany, as well as other western countries with declining 
fertility rates. Although according to Teitelbaum and Winter (1985, 1) the “fear 
of population decline” ebbed and flowed over the past century “depending both 
upon demographic realities and perceptions of the links between population 
change and economic, social, and political power”, the specific discourses of 
the present deserve specific attention on the part of discourse researchers, espe-
cially given a strong political thrust of the topic. In contrast to the sheer amount 
of existing social-scientific literature dealing with demographic change and its 
causes or consequences, there exists a relatively small amount of literature with 
a critical focus on different aspects of the topic4. Even fewer publications ap-
                                                             
4  e.g. Graefe 2013, Schwentker and Vaupel 2011, Bourcarde 2011, Lessenich and Rothermund 
2011, Bogedan et al. 2008, Auth 2007, Barlösius 2007, Hondrich 2007, Berger and Kahlert 
2006, Kistler 2006, Oberndörfer 2005, Bingler and Bosbach 2004, Butterwegge 2002. 
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proach the topic from perspective of or in relation to Foucaultian discourse 
analysis (Foucault 1972, 2010, 2011; Diaz-Bone 2011, 2010, 2008, 2006).5  
A complex synthesis which links a demographically informed genealogy of 
“future-knowledge” (Hartmann and Vogel 2010) in the German population 
with the quantitatively exploding discourse since the turn of the millennium is 
still missing. Besides the forthcoming final monograph of a complex study on 
the transformation of the social perception of aging (Denninger et al. 2014),6 
which explicitly focuses on discourses closely related to the project presented 
in this article, there is still a broad research gap to be filled. This article, based 
on a research project7 that begun in 2009, provides a summary of selected core 
arguments and results in order to outline the direction of the project and to react 
argumentatively on the contemporary discursive dynamics. In writing this 
article at the beginning of 2014, there is a need to point to some changes hap-
pened since the start of the project. On the one hand, leading demographers, 
who also in the past held moderate positions, publish more and more articles 
that critically reflect upon public or/and political impact of demographic 
measures and models (e.g. Schwentker and Vaupel 2011; Sobotka and Lutz 
2011). On the other hand, the empirics of the population and future-knowledge 
based on it are challenged by the controversially discussed national census of 
2011 and a small population growth as a consequence of a huge migration 
surplus in the last years (Federal Statistical Office 2014). Nevertheless, it still 
appears that the hegemony of alarmist articles in the mass-media discourse has 
not sufficiently changed.8 
Hence, the main intention of this article is to give a critical overview of cru-
cial aspects of contemporary demographic change discourses. For this purpose, 
it is first necessary to examine the conditions of the existence of the demo-
graphic statement-system (discourse9) and, therefore, to pursue Foucault’s 
                                                             
5  Lessenich 2013, Van Dyk et al. 2013, Graefe and Lessenich 2012, Denninger et al. 2012, 
2010; Bryant, 2011, Etzemüller 2011, 2008, 2007; Hummel 2000, Ottersbach 1997, Katz 
1992. 
6  The following papers have already been published and give insight into the variously facet-
ted project: Lessenich 2013, Van Dyk et al. 2013, Graefe 2013, Graefe and Lessenich 2012, 
Denninger et al. 2012, 2010; Lessenich and Rothermund 2011, Graefe et al. 2011, Van Dyk 
and Lessenich 2009. Furthermore, a cross-national follow-up project titled “Aging as future” 
is already running since 2012. 
7  Working title: “Demographic Change as Dystopia. A critical analysis of demographic dis-
courses and politics of truth in the German science and public of the beginning 21st centu-
ry”; the project will be finished in 2014 at the a.r.t.e.s. Research School of the Faculty of 
Arts and Humanities of the University of Cologne  
8  Currently, the time horizon of the analysis of the mass-media discourse of the project ends 
in December 2011. 2012, 2013, and 2014 will be included in the dissertation publication in 
order to proof that the tendency has not noticeably changed. 
9  According to Foucault (1972, 117), discourse is understood as “a group of statements in so 
far as they belong to the same discursive formation”. In contrast to the majority of existing 
receptions of Foucault and approaches of discourse analysis based on a different under-
 
HSR 39 (2014) 1  │  303 
(1972, 27) classical archeological question in a slightly modified way: “how is 
it that one particular [system of] statement[s] appeared rather than another?” Its 
underlying rules of formation will be presented and discussed critically in 
chapter 2, whereas chapter 3 will focus on the regularities of the mass-media 
discourse that have been identified in a relatively large corpus. Due to the em-
pirical focus of the article and space restrictions, there is no intention to de-
scribe the theoretical underpinnings of the project in their full length. Instead, a 
rather brief description should help to locate it in the variety of approaches that 
utilize the term “discourse”. In other words, it is an individual adaption of 
Foucaultian discourse analysis to the topic of research from the perspective of 
his late works (2011, 2010), which center on the analysis of orders of truth 
(respectively: systems of thought) as interrelation of Foucault’s three classical 
dimensions of interest:  
What is involved, rather, is the analysis of complex relations between three 
distinct elements none of which can be reduced to or absorbed by the others, 
but whose relations are constitutive of each other. These three elements are: 
forms of knowledge (savoirs), studied in terms of their specific modes of ve-
ridiction; relations of power, not studied as an emanation of a substantial and 
invasive power, but in the procedures by which people’s conduct is governed; 
and finally the modes of formation of the subject through practices of self. It 
seems to me that by carrying out this triple theoretical shift […] we can study 
the relations between truth, power, and subject without ever reducing each of 
them to the others (2011, 9). 
Frédéric Gros summarizes this perspective as:  
never studying discourses of truth without at the same time describing their ef-
fect on the government of self and others; never analyzing structures of power 
without at the same time showing the knowledge and forms of subjectivation 
they rely on; never identifying modes of subjectivation without including their 
political extensions and the relations they have to the truth (Gros in Foucault 
2011, 346).  
Although the entire complexity of this framework will not fully appear in this 
article due to its particular scope, this perspective embodies the specific direc-
tion of discursive research interest. It has already been outlined10 as “Alethurgic 
Discourse Analysis” (Messerschmidt 2011) and is regarding its primarily epis-
temological research interest and focus on depth structures close to the recep-
tion of Rainer Diaz-Bone (2011, 2010, 2008, 2006). 
Stephen Katz stated already over 20 years ago that “popular and profession-
al discourses which currently accentuate the demographic features of aging 
populations are characterized by their alarmism” and therefore named this 
                                                                                                                                
standing, the term is understood here as irreducible to language and speech. Consequently, 
a “deeper” level of orders of thought and knowledge is at stake here, not sentences, propo-
sitions, signs, or speech-acts (Foucault 1972: 49-87). 
10  The detailed conception will be described in the final publication of the project. 
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phenomenon “alarmist demography” (Katz 1992, 204). He embedded such 
alarmism into larger narratives, especially regarding the elderly sub-population 
and its collective dependency, where popular media and think tanks “depict the 
elderly emptying the coffers of the welfare state and creating a tax burden 
beyond the means of the labor force to support” so that apparently “the grow-
ing aging population is threatening to create an economic crisis with profound 
consequences for healthcare systems, social security programs, industrial and 
intergenerational relations” (Katz 1992, 203-4). Katz also pointed out (1992, 
214) that, by following Foucault, “we can say that the institutional differentia-
tion of the elderly population is part of the general biopolitical division of the 
population in Western society” and in consequence, “the alarmist and largely 
negative image of the elderly and their historical construction as a fixed popu-
lation developed in tandem”. What he could clearly oversee in the past, without 
giving more detailed explanation, will be relocated in a bigger picture of the 
present for this article. This will allow retracing discursive rules and regulari-
ties in both discursive arenas of science (chapter 2) and mass media (chapter 3). 
Chapter 2 describes the fabrication of demographic future-knowledge starting 
with preliminary remarks and the current state of the art (2.1), followed by a 
critical reconstruction of the population projections by the German Federal 
Statistical Office (2.2) and of demographic concepts, measures, and data (2.3). 
Chapter 3 focuses on the discourse analysis of a German press corpus from 
2000-2011, with a description of its collection (3.1), the code system, and pre-
liminary results (3.2). Finally, the relation between misunderstandings or “gar-
bled demography” (Teitelbaum 2004) and “demographization” (Barlösius 
2007) will be discussed in the conclusion, in order to outline first contours of a 
recently emerging post-alarmist discourse. 
2.  The Fabrication of Demographic Future-Knowledge 
Before claiming any assumptions about the demographic future, it is necessary 
to know the present. And already there, the problems begin. Despite all the 
ruptures, there is a constant regularity of demographic thought: the concept of 
population in its dynamics. Defining a population is always an inclusion and 
parallel exclusion of people, closely tied to the concept of national state and 
especially in Germany often understood in the problematic concept of “Volk”, 
in implicit or even explicit form (cf. Etzemüller 2007, 145). Meanwhile, even a 
minority of German demographers demonstrated the constructivist character of 
the concept of “population” (Mackensen et al. 2009). A population is con-
structed, insofar as that it depends on borders that have been drawn in relation 
to the historical development of national states (cf. Etzemüller 2008, 203). A 
Foucaultian reception of discourse analysis focusing on systems of thought 
(“episteme”) questions the realism of such demographic “realities”. For this 
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purpose, a reflection of its type and degree of social construction (Hacking 
2000) is very helpful. A deeper examination of the related ontology of the 
present by way of a discourse analysis is a different proposal than an analytic 
of truth (cf. Foucault 2010). This differentiation is compatible with the episte-
mological position that Ian Hacking (2002) described as “dialectical realism”. 
It accommodates the specific character of demographic (future) constructs as 
discursive games of truth intertwined with power relations without falling into 
the trap of epistemic relativism. “Reflexive methodology”, which Tomas Mart-
tila (2013, 12) presented convincingly as a key element for further methodolog-
ical elaboration of governmentality research, also provides a methodological 
foundation for the specific Foucaultian discourse analysis developed for this 
project. Furthermore, Alain Desrosières discussed the problem of the tension 
between realism and conventionalism11 specifically regarding quality criteria of 
official statistics and concluded that the differentiation based on compromise 
solutions relying on structuralist12 thought can help to “understand the often 
obscure debates and controversies triggered by statistical arguments, both in 
the public arena and in the social sciences” (Desrosières 2009, 321). With 
respect to the central demographic concept of “population”, such a debate 
would only become obscure if a consequent reflection upon the boundaries of 
this construction is neglected. Especially with regard to international migration, 
the distinction between country citizens and the “others” is obvious. The prob-
lems start not only with the numerical data base when counting undocumented 
immigrants through estimation. This separation is still visible (and very ques-
tionable) when demographic models exclude the children of immigrants who 
hold national citizenship and assume two separated sub-populations (Bohk 
2012, 178). The demographic key concept of a population is neither neutral, 
nor natural.  
2.1  Preliminary Remarks on the Current State of Art 
Currently, there are only two monographs dealing with the German “population 
discourse” which exist (Hummel 2000; Etzemüller 2007). Both conceptualize it 
as being a substantially monolithic discourse, which can be genealogically 
retraced to the emergence of demography in the late 18th century. There is no 
doubt that both publications contribute to a better understanding of the history 
                                                             
11  The “Économie des Conventions” has recently been a special focus in HSR 37 (2012) 4, 
edited by Rainer Diaz-Bone and Robert Salais. 
12  “Several compromise solutions are available to ease this tension. They rely on the principle 
of separating the signifier (the measurement) and the signified (the object to be measured), 
while linking them by means of varied correspondence terms” (Desrosières 2009, 321). 
Desrosières already raised the problem more than ten years before in his monograph “The 
politics of large numbers” (1998, 1) because: “it is difficult to think simultaneously that the 
objects being measured really do exist, and that this is only a convention”. 
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of present demographic discourses. Contemporary discourses of demographic 
change, however, require more thorough attention. The sociologist Diana 
Hummel (2000, 15) identified demography as a genuine “political science” and 
pointed out that “population” was clearly already a political concept beginning 
with the emergence of the study of demography, which aimed at political regu-
lations based on explanation and prognostics of population dynamics. Although 
a longer genealogy which began with the emergence of demography in the late 
18th century can help in understanding the present discourse, Hummel’s ap-
proach to analyze one monolithic population discourse throughout over two 
centuries is unable to acknowledge variation in depth-structures of the dis-
course: Such a big picture ignores many ruptures of the discourse which be-
come especially visible in a smaller period of time. Additionally, her detailed 
and demographically informed analysis ends exactly at the point when dis-
courses of demographic change spread intensively into the German public via 
the mass-media. Consequently, the analysis presented in this paper covers the 
years 2000 to 2011. Furthermore, the late works of Michel Foucault (2007, 
2008, 2010, 2011) were not published when Hummel wrote her monograph. 
These lectures provide a more complex perspective on the relations of 
knowledge, power, and subject; Hummel could not foresee both of these devel-
opments. Therefore my project can be seen as complementary, empirically 
specialized, and theoretically actualized. The historian Thomas Etzemüller 
examined “the apocalyptical population discourse of the 20th century” (2007) 
in a cross-national, but selective way and without explaining in depth his dis-
course analytical framework. Although his book reveals interesting insights, it 
can only provide additional impulses in order to achieve a deeper understand-
ing of the discourses of the beginning of the 21st century.  
In a summary article, he stated that “the discourse works only through its 
visualization, because demographic processes as such are invisible” (Etzemül-
ler 2008, 210). Although visualization is a crucial element of demographic 
discourses, he seems to overemphasize it at this point. Demographic processes 
are primarily visible through numbers, which demographers produce, calculate, 
and interpret. Their scientific discourse is not at all homogenous, but to a cer-
tain extent consensual phenomenon, which needs transportation into public 
discourses through the mass-media. As this paper will later describe, both 
discursive arenas are intertwined in an epistemologically questionable way, 
which systematically (re-)produces “garbled demography” (Teitelbaum 2004), 
but is not only based on misunderstandings. Visualization plays a crucial role at 
this point: Although demographic discourses cannot be reduced entirely to 
visualization, graphs produce in a certain sense stronger statements, compared 
to tables or sentences. This is caused by what Eva Barlösius called in her cri-
tique on “demographization of the social” a “symbolic surplus”, characterized 
by graphs that evoke one specific interpretation regarding the consequences 
(2007, 17; cf. 2010, 232). Population pyramids, not “invented” but popularized 
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by Friedrich Burgdörfer in 1932 (Etzemüller 2007, 85), and still used for de-
scriptions of the changing age structure of a population, already contain a 
strongly normative framework of the interpretation. The visual scheme from a 
“pyramid” to an “urn” is indeed a classic regularity of “apocalyptic” population 
discourses and is settled in an “ideal” total fertility rate (TFR) of 2.1 children 
per woman, the so-called replacement fertility which leads to a stationary popu-
lation. Implicitly included interpretation is often, however, not as obvious as in 
this case.  
Before focusing on the production of demographic future-knowledge, it is 
important to briefly comment on the status of this project regarding the linguis-
tic turn13: In contrast to Etzemüller, who stated (2011, 101) that his “paper is 
not about demography but the speaking about demographical processes”, this 
paper is about demography as well as the speaking about demographical pro-
cesses. From the theoretical perspective which has been briefly characterized in 
the introduction, there is no good reason why a critique of demographic reason-
ing and underlying categories should not aim toward a more reflected reason-
ing with better categories. Of course, those new categories can be criticized 
later by others for different reasons, because scientific knowledge is always as 
provisional as discursive. Nevertheless, this was not intended by Etzemüller’s 
historically oriented works, whereas this paper has a strong epistemological 
focus on the demographic ontology of the present. This ontology seems to 
become more and more challenged by critique, which is in few cases uttered 
internally and more often externally by scholars of other disciplines. 
2.2  The Population Projections by the German Federal Statistical 
Office 
At the beginning of 2014, Germany’s Federal Statistical Office (Destatis) pub-
lished a press release titled “Increase in the population expected again for 
2013” referring to the strong migration surplus as a cause (Federal Statistical 
Office 2014). In fact, the German total population has been continuously rising 
since 2011, which was the year of trend reversal since 2002 according to Desta-
tis (Federal Statistical Office 2011). Destatis’ recent population projection 
conducted before the trend reversal towards population growth stated: “Germa-
ny’s population has declined since 2003. This decline will continue and even 
accelerate” (Federal Statistical Office 2009, 12). This statement, clearly in 
tension with the introduction of the press release where Destatis “does not 
claim to forecast future developments until 2060” (Federal Statistical Office 
2009, 9), has been doubtlessly falsified by reality for meanwhile three years 
                                                             
13  Rorty 1967; Although Etzemüller is not very explicit about the details of his theoretical 
background, it seems that his reception of Foucault differs regarding the (ir-)reducibility of 
discourse to language and speech-acts (cf. Messerschmidt 2011). 
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(cf. Schwentker 2014) and it is not the first time that a population projection 
has failed (cf. Etzemüller 2007, 146). Nevertheless, it could turn out in the long 
run that the projection results and real developments converge again by 2060, 
as five decades constitute a long period of time. Therefore, demographers as 
well as Destatis emphasize the “long-term and sustained nature of the processes 
of population dynamics” (Federal Statistical Office 2009, 5). This might be true 
retrospectively, but to what extent the demographic projections are uncertain is a 
question to be discussed more deeply.  
If we look at the recent press release of Destatis, which presents the future 
of the German population over the next 50 years, there are many interesting 
details to be discovered. The sub-title of the German version – “coordinated 
pre-calculation of the population”14 – is in noticeable tension with the deter-
ministic population projections by Destatis (see fig. 2). In contrast to a proba-
bilistic projection by the Vienna Institute of Demography (VID, see fig. 3), 
which is also scenario based but includes uncertainty in the visualization, the 
main difference on the level of statements becomes visible:  
Figure 2: German Population 1950-2060 by Destatis (deterministic projection) 
 
                                                             
14  Translated by author. 
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Figure 3: German Population 2005-2050 by VID (probabilistic projection)  
 
Figures 2, 3: deterministic population projection (Source: Federal Statistical Office 2009) vs. 
probabilistic pendant (Source: Scherbov et al. 2008) 
 
The graph from Destatis only shows the outcome of two “medium” scenarios 
that clearly indicate a decline, whereas the VID projection shows a possible 
range of outcomes under the given premises of the scenario with different 
probabilities. In absolute numbers, there is no significant difference between 
the results of Destatis’ upper limit scenario and the median of the VID projec-
tion15. However, the graph from Destatis lacks information that the graph of the 
VID provides and has modified scales of the axes16 with the consequence of a 
more dramatic (visual) decline. If we assume that journalists who mostly do not 
have the necessary statistic or even demographic background knowledge for a 
critical interpretation – and often lack time in order to read the entire press 
release including the few cautious statements about interpretation – it is obvi-
ous which of both graphs contains a “newsworthy” statement. If we treat each 
graph of both shown population projections as discourses, namely “group[s] of 
statements that belong to a single system of formation” (Foucault 1972, 107), 
the task will be to analyze each one’s system of formation. Although both 
graphs are very similar also with regard to their premises, the conclusions to 
which the graphs allude differ fundamentally. In order to understand why, it is 
necessary to reconstruct the crucial parts of episteme they both share and that 
make them different. Both projections refer to the same measures and produce, 
                                                             
15  According to Destatis (Federal Statistical Office 2009, 46), the population in 2050 would 
amount 73,608 for the upper limit (respectively 69.412 million lower limit) compared to 
73.44 million for the median of the VID projection (Scherbov et al. 2008, 40). 
16  X-axis: period enlarged backwards before start of projection, y-axis: rupture between 0 and 
60; consequently, the graph visually declines stronger than without those modifications. 
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at least numerically17 in tables, a quite similar range of results, but strongly 
differ regarding the consideration of uncertainty, especially in the visualization. 
In other words, a population projection can only be as good as its underlying 
assumptions regarding the future development of the three determinants, i.e. 
fertility, mortality, and migration. Destatis uses 12 different scenarios com-
bined with 3 additional “model-calculations”. The majority is excluded in the 
graph of fig. 1 and only presented regarding underlying assumptions in tables 
of the appendix without results or visualization (2009, 36-41). The results of 
these scenarios can only be downloaded separately as Excel sheet. If we com-
pare the assumptions with the past trajectories of the indicators, all scenarios 
share a very artificial static character, so as to the difference between a scenario 
and a “model-calculation” seems to become vanished.  
The total fertility rate (TFR, see fig. 4) has obviously declined since the 
1960s in both parts of Germany. Although the declining trend is well explained 
for the past, the expert opinions for the scenario design are confronted with 
Hume’s problem of induction (a.k.a. “Russell’s inductivist turkey”): why 
should the trend go on? Demographers would protest here and point to the low 
chance for another phenomenon comparable to the “pill-gap”. Still, the three 
constant scenarios that Destatis’ experts offer are epistemologically questiona-
ble, especially regarding limitations of the TFR (see chapter 2.3 of this paper). 
It becomes even more problematic if we look at net migration (see fig. 5). The 
only two options that Destatis’ projections include are either 100,000 or 
200,000 persons per year. But already by 2011 these boundaries were noticea-
bly exceeded (Federal Statistical Office 2012) and in 2012 net migration was 
nearly twice as high as the higher scenario with 394,900 (Federal Statistical 
Office 2013). This might be hardly a surprising occurrence of a “black swan” 
(Taleb 2007). It could partially be a consequence of one, if we would interpret 
the 2008 financial crisis that way. But regardless of possible causes, the past 
trajectory of the graph shows what every demographer knows: migration is an 
almost unpredictable result of the fact that people “make history”, which is 
highly dependent on political decisions. The question whether the underestima-
tion of net migration is related to the fact that Herwig Birg – who frequently 
uttered his pro-natalist and anti-immigration position in naturalized form (2007, 
2005, 2001; see chapter 3 of this paper) – holds the first place of Destatis’ list 
of experts for its scenario assumptions (Federal Statistical Office 2009, 10) 
shares the epistemological status of the projections regarding their long-term 
results: mere speculation. 
 
                                                             
17  According to the separate Excel sheet, Destatis’ minimum amounts 64,365 million in 2050 
(Model calculation with zero net-migration), whereas the maximum amounts 82,580 million 
(Model calculation with TFR=2.1), compared to range from 61,08 to 86,098 million for the 
80% prediction interval of the VID projection. 
HSR 39 (2014) 1  │  311 
Figure 4: Destatis’ assumptions for Total Fertility Rate to 2060  
 
Figure 5: Destatis’ assumptions for Net Migration to 2060 
 
Figures 4, 5: past development and Destatis’ scenario assumptions for total fertility rate and 
net migration (Source: Federal Statistical Office 2009). 
 
HSR 39 (2014) 1  │  312 
2.3  Problems of Concepts, Measures, and Data 
We have seen that the outcome of a population projection is highly dependent 
on underlying assumptions of fertility, mortality, and migration. Among those, 
only mortality trends seem to be relatively certain, although even those could 
be negatively changed by a “black swan”, as, for instance, in the case of an 
epidemic of multi-resistant viruses, which we hopefully will not experience. 
Regarding the total fertility rate (TFR, or more exactly “period TFR”, abbrevi-
ated PTFR), the problem is much more complex than induction. Recently, two 
leading demographers, namely Tomáš Sobotka and Wolfgang Lutz, empha-
sized that the PTFR, which  
has become the ubiquitous fertility indicator of choice since the 1960s […] is 
commonly labeled as the ‘mean number of children per woman’ by many de-
mographers and statistical offices and, in consequence, also by journalists and 
politicians (Sobotka and Lutz 2011, 638).  
It may not be surprising that Destatis notes the same on the y-axis of the dia-
gram. Moreover, the conventional PTFR used by Destatis is distorted by tem-
po-effects (Bongaarts and Feeney 1998) due to the birth timing and the simple 
fact that it does not reflect future births of female cohorts that have not yet 
ended their reproductive phase. There are approaches to estimate a tempo-
adjusted TFR, which try to compensate for the noticeable underestimation (see 
fig. 6), but the “real” cohort TFR (CTFR) is available only for past cohorts. 
Estimates for a tempo-adjusted TFR have also been calculated by VID demog-
raphers for years; for example in 2008, it amounts to 1.69 (VID 2012), what is 
compared to the conventional TFR of around 1.4 a noticeable difference, espe-
cially when referred to the context of population projections. Unfortunately, 
there is not yet any projection using tempo-adjusted TFR estimates. 
Sobotka and Lutz (2011, 638) criticize that 
[i]n the public discourse relatively few references are made to cohort fertility 
as the adequate measure of fertility or to other indicators of period fertility that 
may better reflect changes in fertility trends. Likewise, little reference is made 
to trends in the absolute number of births, which after all directly determine 
the future size and age structure of the population. Although all demographers 
should be aware of the serious problems associated with calling the period 
TFR the ‘mean number of children per woman’, a notion that only makes 
sense from a cohort perspective, there is hardly any public discussion about 
this.  
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Figure 6: Total Fertility Rate in Western and Eastern Germany According to the 
Conventional TFR and the Tempo-Adjusted TFR, 1950-2010 
 
 
Source: Luy and Pötzsch 2010, 622. 
 
This critical diagnosis could have spread through the mass-media, but (not) 
surprisingly, the echo in the press was minimal. Unfortunately, the previously 
discussed critique that Sobotka and Lutz express in condensed precision seems 
to be too technical to evoke a scandal. Nevertheless, both conclude that  
there is a strong case for stopping the use of the period TFR as a one-fits-all 
fertility indicator which is currently a common practice. While demographers 
are increasingly aware of the pitfalls associated with the period TFR, their 
continuous reliance on this measure fuels large misperceptions of fertility lev-
els and dynamics among policy makers, the media and the general public. As 
a minimum reporting standard, demographers who still choose to use the peri-
od TFR should stop referring to it as the “mean number of children per wom-
an”, which it evidently is not. The choice of the most appropriate indicator 
must depend on the question asked. (Sobotka and Lutz 2011, 655-6)  
From a scientific point of view, this conclusion seems almost trivial, but the 
complexity of demographic measures seems to be a strong obstacle for media-
tion of this problem to journalists. 
After the critical examination of the used methods and indicators, there are 
two other crucial problems with the “rationality” of population projections. On 
the one hand, the data base for Germany is not as reliable as non-experts would 
expect. In fact, the data has been interpolated since the last census (1981 for 
East- and 87 for West-Germany) and therefore distorted, especially due to the 
reunification process. Although there was recently a new census in 2011, its 
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results are still controversially being discussed regarding methodical deficits, 
and have thus not yet been used for any official population projection. On the 
other hand, age as a demographic key measure needs to be reflected upon. The 
same could be said about the dependency ratio, which is an age-based construc-
tion of high importance when it comes to the consequences of demographic 
change. Again, the problem of the related discourse is the unreflected naturali-
zation of the used categories:  
Using chronological age, we are lead implicitly to think that people of the 
same age in different years would behave similarly, but because of life expec-
tancy increases there are aspects of behavior where this might not be the case. 
For example, a 45 year old in 2050 might well behave in many ways like a 35 
year old in 2000 if they had the same remaining life expectancy. It is precisely 
because many behaviors depend on the number of years left to live that it is 
important to supplement the usual backwardlooking definition of age with a 
forward-looking one (Sanderson and Scherbov 2007, 28).  
This striking argument by Warren C. Sanderson and Sergei Scherbov basically 
aims at the quality of age measures and leads to far-reaching consequences:  
The aging of populations and of people have different dynamics. Surviving 
people must grow one year older each year. Populations, on the other hand, do 
not necessarily grow one year older each year. Populations can grow more than 
one year older, less than one year older or even grow younger with the passage 
of time. When age is measured as a two dimensional variable our descriptions of 
population aging grow more complex. With two ages to consider, populations 
can simultaneously grow younger according to one measure and older according 
to the other (Sanderson and Scherbov 2007, 29). 
To illustrate this effect, let us take a look at another demographic measure, 
which is based on age: The conventional dependency ratio is the ratio of the 
“dependent” sub-population, typically calculated as the number of people aged 
65+, divided by the number of people of working age, 15 or 20 to 64. Sander-
son and Scherbov criticize (2010, 1287): “When using indicators that assume 
fixed chronological ages, it is implicitly assumed that there will be no progress 
in important factors such as remaining life expectancies and in disability rates”. 
Consequently, they present a prospective version (POADR) using a forward-
looking age measure which would reduce the projected increase in 2050 al-
ready by one third, whereas a dependency ratio that refers to a disability adjust-
ed aging measure leads to a reduction by more than two thirds (see table 1). If 
we combine these alternative possibilities with all the uncertainties and limita-
tions discussed, the “drama” of demographic change loses its alleged justifica-
tion and becomes much less dramatic. 
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Table 1: Different Types of Dependency Ratios by Sanderson and Scherbov 
(2010); Own Calculations Regarding Increase 
OADR (Old-age dependency ratio) 
  2005-10 2025-30 2045-50 
Germany        0,33 0,48 0,63 
increase 0,15 0,30 
% 45,45 90,91 
POADR (Prospective OADR) 
  2005-10 2025-30 2045-50 
Germany        0,21 0,25 0,34 
increase 0,04 0,13 
% 19,05 61,90 
ADDR (Adult disability dependency ratio) 
  2005-10 2025-30 2045-50 
Germany        0,12 0,13 0,15 
increase 0,01 0,03 
% 8,33 25,00 
 
To summarize, a diagnosis by Konietzka and Geisler (2008, 167), who already 
noticed over five years ago how unreflected the contemporary debate uses 
demographic measures and how frequently alleged objective data are used, 
which do not hold an exact empirical observation, is still valid: “Already the 
description of central parameter of demographic change can cause unexpected 
problems, either because of an insufficient available data base or because the 
interpretation of demographic parameter requires in many cases more premises 
than it may appear”18. As we have seen, central concepts of the demographic 
“formal core” (Hummel 2000) like population, age and other measures are 
misinterpreted as “objective” facts by some demographers and the majority of 
journalists. This is the main cause for at least reductionist but often even false 
mediation of demographic knowledge into the public discourse: “garbled de-
mography” (Teitelbaum 2004). Nevertheless, the construction of population 
projections, especially by Destatis but also in general, has illustrated that the 
tendency of demographization is inherent from the beginning. Subsequently, 
both elements will be explained based on the analysis of the press corpus and 
selected results. 
3.  Demographic Change in the German Press from 2000-
2011 
Good demographers try to avoid horror scenarios, stated James W. Vaupel, 
founding director of the Max Planck Institute of Demography (MPIDR) when 
                                                             
18  Translated by author. 
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he was interviewed by Björn Schwentker for “Die Zeit”, a journalist with pro-
found demographic knowledge, which is a rare combination, (2006-03-17). 
Half a year later, Vaupel also stated in the weekly magazine “Der Spiegel” 
(2006-10-24) that “[t]here is too much angst in Germany and not enough 
hope.” Nevertheless, the majority of newspaper articles have at least a negative 
tendency – and many horror scenarios can be found in the media as well as a 
variety of scientific books dealing with the topic. How come? Teitelbaum ex-
plains the oversimplification and problematic reductions of complexity as 
being a result of “fundamental cultural differences between demographers and 
journalists, and an equally large divergence in the incentive structures faced by 
professionals in these two domains” (2004, 317). Besides the misinterpretation 
of projections as forecasts, he criticizes the attraction of journalists toward long 
projection intervals, keeping in mind the uncertainty of projections over time. 
Consequently, demographers aiming for public impact tend to produce simpli-
fied press releases or summaries findings, fully aware of the journalistic expec-
tations:  
In part the fault may lie […] in demographic reports, as when ‘projections’ 
and ‘forecasts’ are confused with each other, or when the future tense form 
‘will’ is used rather than the conditional ‘would’ in describing the quantitative 
outputs […]. (Teitelbaum 2004, 325)  
According to Michael S. Teitelbaum, the other sources of fault may be found in 
the PR staff’s motivation to catch busy journalists’ attention and journalistic 
misinterpretation of hypothetical demographic scenarios, which politicians and 
activists (mis-)use as recommendations if they match their interests. Although 
this description of one element which narrows the discourse is convincing regard-
ing the scandalizing functional logics of the press and media, the problem of 
demographic power/knowledge seems to be more complex, as the last paragraph 
illustrated and this one will show based on the mass-media discourse. 
3.1  Description of Corpus Generation 
The press corpus for the analysis of the public discourse has been constructed 
using online archives of the leading newspapers and magazines in combination 
with LexisNexis.19 It consists of 2900 articles covering the period of twelve 
years between 2000 and 2011,20 a period in which the number of articles in-
creases permanently except for 2007-8 (see fig. 7): 
                                                             
19  <http://www.lexisnexis.com>. 
20  The period of 2012-2014 will be included in the final publication of the project. 
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Figure 7: Overview of Articles over Time: 2000-2011 
 
Although completeness of a corpus is illusionary and practically unrealistic, the 
selection of sources was intended to be as complete as possible. Therefore, the 
increasing number of articles can be interpreted as a tendency of the discourse 
and not only of the corpus related to the publications included. The following 
selection criteria have been used in order to decide upon the inclusion or exclu-
sion of publications: (1) digital availability over the entire period,21 (2) pres-
ence of the entire political spectrum, and (3) providing of specific argumenta-
tion regarding demographic change. In the first step, a variety of other 
newspapers and journals were downloaded, but according to those criteria not 
included in the final sample. Although this is certainly a bias generated by the 
conditions of available data, the effect on the explanatory power of the results 
might be relatively small since all major publications are present. The excluded 
local newspapers often only reproduce the articles of the supraregional press 
due to shared ownership and editorial staff, sometimes even identically. For 
similar reasons, the initial idea to also include newswires into the corpus has 
been discarded. On the one hand, those are often used with only slight modifi-
cations due to tendencies toward staff reduction. On the other hand, it was 
impossible to handle the size of a corpus enlarged by newswires, which also 
                                                             
21  The only exception is the leading tabloid “BILD”, included from 2006 onwards because of its 
relevance (see fig. 7, which shows that the strong increase of BILD articles started in 2008). 
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were not completely available. Another possible bias is the combination of 
search keywords and categories, which has been tested in manifold combina-
tions before downloading the articles in order to obtain as many articles as 
possible matching the criteria. Quantity matters for the corpus construction 
only to minimize the risk to exclude important elements. The analysis itself 
focuses on the qualitative aspects, although the quantification of code frequen-
cies as a result of the annotation process in MaxQDA is also used. In this 
mixed-methods research design, numbers are only used to describe internal 
relations of the discursive regularities. Such regularities are in fact practices of 
scientists, journalists, politicians, and other experts which affect the discourses 
and are affected by it. Generalizing such relations to whatever larger discursive 
entity in other boundaries would be methodically pointless and far away from the 
research interest of the project that focuses on specific regimes of truth. The 
resulting corpus consists of the following elements in the timeframe of analysis 
(see fig. 8): 
Figure 8: Corpus Dynamics over Time for Different Publications 
 
 
The graph clearly indicates that the “Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung” (FAZ) 
can be seen as “avant-garde” of the public discourse in 2003. This can be ex-
plained by the huge presence of Prof. Herwig Birg, who published his opinion 
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there frequently, and of course, the high interest of one of the editors, Frank 
Schirrmacher. His demographic dystopia “The Methusalem Complot” was 
published one year later. This bestseller had a huge public impact and was 
translated into 14 languages. “Die Welt” reacted immediately after the FAZ. 
Later on, all other magazines and newspapers follow the freshly set agenda 
regardless of their political tendency. Surprisingly, the largest German tabloid 
“BILD” entered the discourse relatively late. However, this delayed start is 
compensated by a massive charge in alarmism: The first article included in the 
corpus from 2006 is interestingly based on a long-term population projection 
and titled “In 12 generation we Germans will become extinct” (see fig. 9). 
Figure 9: Code System and Document Structure in MaxQDA with BILD Article, 
Titled “In 12 generation we Germans will become extinct” Based on a 
Questionable Population Projection by Prof. Herwig Birg 
 
3.2  Code System and Selected Results 
As partially visible in the screenshot (fig. 9), the code system which has been 
generated inductively22 during the process of coding is relatively complex. Its 
structure is divided into three main parts: relation to demographic knowledge 
regarding content and data sources, consequences of demographic change, and 
                                                             
22  In order to be precise, inductively must be put in quotation marks: this “induction” is only 
insofar inductive, that it is based on certain categories of interest which have been deduct-
ed before according to the research question. Letting the discourse “speak” without any 
pre-assumptions is impossible. Instead, discourse analysis has to develop an appropriate re-
search design according to theoretical background, topic, and research question(s). (cf. Fou-
cault 1972) Due to space limits, those methodological aspects can only be touched here and 
will be taken into account more detailed in the final publication of the project. 
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reaction strategies or consequences of its consequences. Additionally, other 
necessary categories for a cartography of the discourse have been annotated, 
such as time horizon (present/ future), local reference (from municipal up to 
global level), mode of veridiction (only two forms: expert and prophet), and 
various other specific regularities of statements, including also their more or 
less absurd expressions. Due to the limited text length, it is only possible to 
present the main elements of the code system related to the typical strands of 
argumentation here. The subsequent graph (see fig. 10) is a visualization of the 
most frequent codes in the three main parts. It reduces the complexity of 282 
codes with currently 30009 frequencies in 2900 documents to a reasonable 
amount. The distinction of input and output is only used for orientation and 
should not be understood as any kind of causal model. In fact, the storyline of 
the visualized chain of argumentation varies strongly: only a minority of most-
ly longer articles presents the full storyline (Hajer 2005), whereas the majority 
addresses parts or sometimes only one part of it. Nevertheless, the aspect of 
repetition is important here. On the one hand, even small descriptive press 
releases, e.g. by Destatis, contribute quantitatively to the perception, that the 
discourse is important and set it permanently on the agenda of the press. On the 
other hand, after years of increasing news coverage at a time when demograph-
ic change has become a commonplace, only small elements of the argumenta-
tion line are able to evoke the entire discourse for the reader. For instance, if a 
diagnosis presented in the article is that there is a lack of birth there is not much 
imagination needed to relate it to the alleged insecurity of the pension system. 
A noticeable number of articles even draw conclusions which embody “de-
mographization of the social” to nearly extreme extents: demographic change is 
claimed to be responsible for nearly everything from lack of public toilets (Der 
Spiegel, 2009-07-01) to the loss of church members or candidates for an army 
career, which are frequently presented as results of demographic change al-
ready nowadays, and not only in the future. At least to informed readers, such 
mono-causal articles could appear as absurd claims, which could be explained 
in many different ways addressing social change instead of demographic 
change. Nevertheless, the absurdity of those peaks of demographization turned 
out to be systematic in the analysis.23 
                                                             
23  The final publication will include this code category in all detail.  
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Figure 10: MAXMaps Visualization of Selected Code System Elements and  
  Argumentation Structure 
 
 
When demographers mention demographic change, the meaning is quite simple 
and clear as we have seen above. In contrast, it becomes more widespread and 
blurred when journalists deal with the topic (see. fig. 11): 54% of the articles 
refer to population (over-)aging and 40% to its shrinking. Besides the two 
major strands, the texts address the following components of the topic: fertility 
decline (31%), growing life expectancy (15%), internal migration (9%), child-
lessness (8%), replacement fertility (4%), sex-ratio (2%), and emigration (1%). 
Again, although this distribution tells us nothing about the variety of combina-
tions in the text, the elements are rarely presented as a coherent storyline in the 
way demographers would do it. Instead, there is a variety of terms signifying 
each of these concepts. It seems to be enough to mention the process without 
any further explanation (15%) or simply one element in order to evoke an 
association with the entire narrative. This goes hand in hand with the fact that 
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around two-thirds of all articles refer to the future, whereas the other third 
suggests that demographic change already affects the present. Some articles 
even state both, and it is this intersection which shows the rationality of the 
heterogeneous relations to demographic knowledge: present processes of inter-
nal migration or the current development of indicators that affect demographic 
change in future are already included in order to dramatize (16% of all articles 
describe the topic as a dramatic or drastic process). Nevertheless, nearly half of 
the articles refer to population projections or mention their results, what shows, 
despite the problem of “garbled demography”, how strong the impact of this 
method is.  
Figure 11: Components of Population Dynamics Referenced to Demographic  
  Change 
 
 
33
52
123
238
250
426
907
1157
1240
1564
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600
emigration
sex ratio
"ideal" TFR=2,1
childlessness
internal migration
growing life-expectancy
low fertility
shrinking population
reference to population projection
(over-)ageing population
References to Demographic Knowledge
HSR 39 (2014) 1  │  323 
Figure 12: (Data) Sources or “Experts” Mentioned in Press Articles  
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Another code category has been developed in order to take into account possi-
ble data sources, i.e. “experts”24 or institutes referenced in the article (see fig. 
12). The German Federal Statistical Office (Destatis) is the data source most 
frequently used, from 3 up to 10 times more than any other public or private 
research institute. At this point, the corpus clearly indicates the hegemonial 
position of Destatis in formatting the discourse, not including implicit reference 
that might be even higher. Not surprisingly, only 9 of 2900 press articles refer 
to the VID as a data source without presenting their population projection 
graph, whereas 394 refer to Destatis and often present the declining curves. 
Regarding think tanks and lobby organizations such as the Berlin Institute for 
Population and Development, which regularly produces scientifically question-
able projections with a high impact on the public, has the leading position, 
closely followed by the powerful Bertelsmann foundation. On the level of 
individuals, Herwig Birg, Germany’s former leading demographic “expert” 
with strong apocalyptical tendency in his publications in science (2007, 2005, 
2001) and media, is at the center of attention. He has successfully put much 
effort into framing the discourse according to his opinion and raising its (and 
his) public and political importance. In conclusion, the internal power relations 
regarding influences on the public discourse with such strong “vectors” of at 
least not neutral sources already allows to predict, that the overall tendency of 
the public discourse is also everything else than an objective description of 
demographic scenarios under specific assumptions. Instead, already at the stage 
of data sources for the press we are confronted with a more or less stable coali-
tion of interests that profit from naturalization and dramatization of demo-
graphic future-knowledge. 
Doubtlessly, this can lead to even more confusion, for example when an ar-
ticle identifies internal migration processes as consequences of demographic 
change. In fact, this identification camouflages regional disparities caused by a 
variety of political and economic decisions as an effect of an “inevitable/ irre-
versible” (n=137) demographic “megatrend” (n=26). This is problematic inso-
far as that the hidden rigorous market logic of municipal concurrence invokes 
the conclusion that structurally weak areas should better be given up. At the 
end of this tale, Germans, East-Germans, Hessians, or artisans will extinct 
(n=24). Or, alternatively, “wolves replace the human” (n=19) in many parts of 
eastern Germany and the de-industrialized Ruhr area, as the think tank Berlin 
Institute of Population and Development tries to prove with scientifically ques-
tionable maps and indices. The untold part of such discourses which promote 
some sort of social darwinism of the regions is obvious: political influence is 
not considered at all because there is “no alternative” (n=47) to the abandoning 
of such regions in the next decades. This example also embodies a general 
                                                             
24  The figure of the expert is highly dominant in the mass-media discourse (n=640) and em-
bodies one of the four modes of veridiction outlined by Foucault (2011, 9). 
HSR 39 (2014) 1  │  325 
pattern: Demographic change and population dynamics are more presented as 
premises than results of political action. The latter has moved us toward the 
topic of consequences of demographic change, which appears to be addressed 
in very one-dimensional alarmist ways (see fig. 13). 
The rationality of this structure is obvious when we remember the related 
argumentation scheme (see fig. 10) and look at the most frequent codes: Even 
the most frequent positive code occurs only in less than 5% of the articles. The 
interest served by the so-called “silver economy” lends itself more to private 
than public interests, whereas the reduction of unemployment, which is only 
addressed by 2% of the articles, plays a more ambivalent role with regard to the 
cost of labor. Nevertheless, the main scheme of private use and socialized costs 
becomes implicitly visible in the few positive consequences. It becomes more 
clearly visible in the majority of the negative consequences. In general, the 
dependency ratio is the key element here, although the explicit coding frequen-
cy is relatively low (7%): The most frequent codes are predominantly macro-
economic, and either focused on the labor market (n=636, 22%) or on the so-
cial insurances (cumulated n=1540), mostly the pension system (n=589, 20%). 
Again, not much imagination is needed when thinking about the corresponding 
interests, especially taking into account the code distribution for think tanks 
and lobby organizations (see fig. 12). The picture becomes more complete 
when compared to the reaction strategies to the alleged “inevitable” conse-
quences (see fig. 14). 
Besides more or less funny products like care-robots, which critical minds 
could already interpret as symptom of a present social pathology, the focus lies 
again on labor market issues and the social insurance system, which is an inter-
esting new market if the imperative of privatization is followed. To what extent 
those codes embody a specific form of contemporary demographic governmen-
tality under the paradigms of activation (Lessenich 2008), entrepreneurship of 
the self (Bröckling 2007), or numerocracy (Angermüller 2010) will be let open 
to the interpretation of the reader.25 
 
                                                             
25  Again, the limited space of this article makes it impossible to discuss a potentially contro-
versial interpretation of the results regarding governmentality. Furthermore, Denninger et 
al. (2014) which was not yet published when this article was written seems to promise a 
fruitful source for that issue. Therefore, the final publication of this project will include a 
detailed discussion of it. 
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Figure 13: (Alleged) Consequences of Demographic Change 
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Figure 14: Reaction Strategies to Consequences of Demographic Change 
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4.  Conclusion 
The question posed by the title of this article implies a choice. Nevertheless, 
strong reductionist tendencies in Germany’s leading population projections that 
serve alarmist purposes (see chapter 2) and the strongly biased discourse of the 
mass media (see chapter 3) lead us to a more differentiated answer: Given the 
premise that “garbled demography” as such is insufficient to describe the dis-
tortion of discourses of demographic change, both phenomena coexist in a 
closely intertwined way. As was described in chapter 2, there is clear indication 
of a process of demographization already from the beginning of the generation 
of demographic future-knowledge. This process is inherent in central concepts 
(age), measures (TFR), methods (deterministic model), and assumptions (fertil-
ity, net migration) used for the calculation. It embodies another, more specified 
and rather detailed discursive “matrix” of demographic change, which can be 
interpreted as complementary to the long-run historical one that Etzemüller 
(2007, 41) pointed out for “the population discourse” of the 20th century. Nev-
ertheless, there is an indication that speaking of “the” discourse lacks com-
plexity from an epistemological perspective. The assumption of one such dis-
cursive entity may be fruitful for historical description, but needs to be more 
differentiated, if particular orders of knowledge and specific systems of thought 
are in the focus of interest. Consequently, this matrix cannot be separated from 
phenomena of “garbling”: the mass media’s functional logics is centered on 
attention and, therefore, has an inherent preference for alarmism and dramatiza-
tion.  
The comparison of the population projections of Destatis (deterministic) and 
the VID (probabilistic), where the main difference is not numerical but present-
ed as the visual statement, exemplifies the implicit link between the scientific 
discourse and its “echo” in the press. The mass media discourse is clearly not 
only the response but also a structural precondition for the scientific discourse: 
Contemporary population projections by Destatis serve the media’s need for 
scandals. The various elements of the discursive “matrix” that indicate a declin-
ing and aging population have been used to construct an allegedly “inevitable 
development” (Federal Statistical Office in Bosbach 2004, 2) in the past. More 
recently, the aim has been formulated more weakly as “effects of demographic 
trends that can be identified from today’s perspective” (Federal Statistical 
Office 2009, 5), but the discursive scheme behind stays identical, just as the 
deterministic method and total population graphs that visually overestimate the 
decline and underestimate uncertainty. Let us assume Destatis’ graph would 
look more similar to the probabilistic pendant of the VID. Then, given the 
structure of the mass media discourse described in chapter 3, the quantity of 
press articles would reduce drastically, but the quality of the discussion could 
probably rise. 
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To summarize, the main intention of this article is not to condemn demo-
graphic research as such, or to underestimate the importance of the work of the 
German Federal Statistical Office. Nevertheless, the need for a systematic and 
synthetic critique of the ongoing demographization processes is increasingly 
uttered implicitly (e.g. Sobotka and Lutz 2011) or even explicitly: Björn 
Schwentker, a critical data journalist, and James W. Vaupel, founding director 
of the Max-Planck-Institute for Demographic Research, already argued more 
than two years ago for “a new culture of [demographic] change” (Schwentker 
and Vaupel 2011). Instead of alarmism, Schwentker and Vaupel criticize the 
standpoint which sees Demographic change as a fundamental social problem 
and refer to it as one of the biggest misunderstandings of the present. It is 
caused by “a public debate, in which facts of Demographic change are often 
misunderstood and misinterpreted negatively, even apocalyptically” 
(Schwentker and Vaupel 2011, 3). 26 More recently, Schwentker published six 
theses on truth regarding demographic change, which inspire to think further: 
1) “It not true that demographic change is a problem. (Nevertheless, there are 
problems.) 
2) It is true that demographic change is natural and good. 
3) It is not about truth, but about prevailing of interests. 
4) The debate is not orientated towards (e.g. scientific) truth, but towards ques-
tionable norms. 
5) There are frequently wrong conclusions because of wrong interpretation of 
demographic data. 
6) The truth is often not identifiable, because necessary data does not exist.” 
(Schwentker 2013). 27 
Unfortunately, a new culture of demographic change which reacts upon those 
theses has not yet been established, taking aside a growing minority of critical 
articles in science and media that more and more prove the tendency of break-
ing up the consensus of the demographic formal core, what Riley and McCarty 
(2003) already diagnosed ten years ago. During the reconstruction of discursive 
regularities and ruptures we have seen that the question “how the related dis-
course becomes ‘true’ “ is closely intertwined with power relations, partially 
stemming from the structure and production imperatives of the mass-media, 
partially form specific political interests. From the beginning, the “formal core” 
shaped demographic knowledge into a direction which allows political instru-
mentalization. The “triple shift” of power, knowledge, and subject is therefore 
a promising strategy to examine the prevailing dominance of this reductionist 
                                                             
26  Translated by author 
27  Translated by author; The term truth can sometimes evoke serious misunderstandings 
especially in discourse research, in general here is nothing to criticize from a Foucaultian 
perspective, at least as long as the differentiation and relation of “games of truth” and 
“analytic of truth” described in the beginning of chapter 2 is kept in mind. 
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formalism of a “political science” (Hummel 2000). The hegemony of the “for-
mal core” is evident. Hence, the first discursive programming leads to internal 
neglecting of the social construction aspects in the scientific discourse. It goes 
hand in hand with a second, which is based on the political charge of the disci-
pline itself and a third, which is based on the functional logics of the mass-
media. Therefore, a generalizing answer “why and how demographers adapt 
their knowledge in more or less reductionist or dramatized way” would be too 
short-cut.  
However, it is obvious that the media’s greed for scandals invokes a specific 
modification of demographic knowledge, if intended to cause huge medial 
impact. Cautious und uncertain scientific knowledge does not attract much 
attention. Researchers in general, and especially demographers in particular, 
need this attention in order to become visible – at least since the public dis-
course sphere has opened itself up for their mostly dramatic topic. Consequent-
ly, at the intersection of the three different levels, a meaning reductionist appa-
ratus which affects researchers’ practice and leads to a distortion of 
demographic future-knowledge emerges, which is then multiplied in the pro-
cess of the mediation of scientific discourses into the public. Due to the high 
degree of technicality in the scientific discourse on demographic change, cer-
tain gaps of reflection may be brought forward if researchers tend to naturalize 
the categories they use. Over ten years ago, Hummel (2000, 326) therefore 
came to the destructive conclusion that demography would probably need to 
put its own scientific status into question. Although there are shared premises 
of critique due to a different theoretical and empirical scope, which allows for 
the possibility of more differentiation, this article concludes differently. The 
intention is clearly not to end with a generalized judgment about a multifaceted 
discipline, which consists of a pluralism of different discourses, sometimes 
with clear ruptures between each other, and sometimes more as a continuous 
scale between different positions. Instead, the preliminary conclusion shares 
the same provisional status that characterizes every type of scientific 
knowledge. Nevertheless, the reasons given in order to elaborate on the arising 
post-alarmist demographic discourse a little bit further have been presented in 
order to promote internal and external reflections on demographic change. 
Although this article showed a growing tendency of critical self-reflection by 
demographers, this is still not typical for the majority of this highly fragmented 
interdisciplinary discipline, which is often also practiced by economists who 
might lack reference to sociological or/and philosophical insights. However, it 
would again be too short-cut to make only demographic researchers responsible 
for the shape of the discourse. Critical journalism, unfortunately declining since 
the emergence of the challenge for the traditional press brought by internet 
media, is a necessary element. “Data journalism” (Schwentker 2013) is another 
one aimed to avoid unreflected reproduction of alleged “objective” research 
results. Finally, research institutes which are part of the scientific community 
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could perhaps think of ways of more interventionist and active public relations, 
if demography wants to prevent the hegemony of questionable “studies” by 
think-tanks and “experts” which camouflage particular political interests and 
shape the medial discourse in the way of the recent past.  
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